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ABSTRACT
In models dealing with rationing, corner solutions, non-linear budget
constraints, or endogenously switching regimes, utility theory plays a
more crucial role than in traditional demand systems. If in these models
negativity of the Slutsky matrix is violated, the models will in general
not be coherent, in the sense that the endogenous variablea are not
determined unambiguously by the model, or, loosely speaking, that
'probabilities' do not sum to one. The first goal of this paper is to
illustrate the type of coherency problems that may be encountered in some
non-standard neoclassical models. Secondly, the paper points out that
estimating without imposing coherency is inappropriate in the sense that
it will often yield inconsistent estimators, even though the true data
generating process is coherent. In the third place, the paper shows how to
impose neoclassical regularity conditions in some 'large enough' region of
quantity and~or price space. Imposing these restrictions is in general
sufficient for coherency, and we argue that in meny cases it is also
'almost necessary'.- 1 -
1. Introduction
Empirical researchers in the field of demand theory are becoming
increasingly aware of the tight structure that may be imposed on their
models by neoclassical theory. In the somewhat older literature on demand
systems a typical approach would be to choose a particular representation
of preferences and derive the corresponding demsnd functions. After
tacking on an error term, the system would next be estimated. In the
estimation, restrictions from neoclassical theory might or might not be
imposed. In either case authors often have tested the various Slutsky
conditions for their particular empirical specification, with mixed
results (see, e.g., Barten, 197~). As noted by McElroy (198~) the
attention for consistency with neoclassical theory has mostly been limited
to the systematic part of the demand equations, with a rather cavalier
treatment of the error structure. Her own work is a notable exception in
this respect.
Whether or not authors would severely test neoclassical restrictions
for their data set, it seems fair to say that in a standard demand system
the empirical specification ís rather loosely connected with the
underlying theory. If the estimation results turn out to be inconsiatent
with a utility maximization hypothesis, the empirical model can still be
regarded as an adequate description of reality.
This is no longer true in more complicated situations where the
theory is used more intensively. In models dealing with rationing, corner
solutions, non-linear budget constraints, or endogenously switching
regimes, utility theory plays a more crucial role than in traditional
demand systems. If in these models regularity conditions are violated,
then these models will in general not be coherent, in the sense that the
endogenous variable is not determined unambiguously by the model, or, in
other words, the reduced form is not well-defined. See e.g. Heckman
(19~8), who refers to coherency as 'the principal assumption'.
The first gosl of this paper is to illustrate the type of coherency
problems that may be encountered in non-standard neoclassical models by
means of two examples (section 2). In the literature, coherency of some
specific models has been enalysed before. For example, Ransom (198~e) has
noted that the demand system based on the quadratic utility function with
non-negativity constraints introduced by Wales end Woodland (1983) is
coherent if the parameters satisfy certain regularity conditions, which
are closely connected to global concavity of the corresponding expenditure-z-
function (i.e., 'negativity'). Similarly, Hausman (1985) and MaCurdy et
al. (1988) note the importance of negativity for coherency in individual
labour supply models with kinked budget constraints. In Van Scest and
Kooreman (1987), it is shown that the approach of Lee and Pitt (1986) to
the indirect translog demand system with non-negativity constrainta via
the use of shadow prices may lead to incoherent models unless conditians
are imposed on the parameters. These conditions appear to be closely
related to concavity of the expenditure function. In the context of
simultaneous linear equation models with endogenously switching regimes,
coherency has been analysed by Gourieroux et al. (1980). In the models
they consider, coherency conditions have the form of restrictions on
parameters only. In the models that we consider, conditions generally not
only depend on fixed parameters, but also on the possible values of the
exogenous variables and of the error terms, in particular those
representing random preferences.
In empirical applications, one possible approach is to ignore
coherency conditions in estimating the model and check afterwards (per
observation) whether coherency or regularity conditions are satisfied. The
second goal of this paper is to point out that this practice is
inappropriate, in the sense that it may lead to inconsistent estimators,
at least if maximum likelihood is used. Let O be the space of paremeters
which generate coherent models and let 6~ ~ 0 be an extension of the
parameter space, including parameters which do not yield a coherent model.
In section 3, we present an example of a bivariate Probit model, for which
the likelihood function (which is defined on 6 only) can be written as a
product of cumulative normal probabilities. The same formula can be used
to define a natural extension of the likelihood function to O'. If
coherency is ignored, this extension will be maximized on O'. We show that
this yields an inconsistent estimator with probability límit outside 6,
even though the true peremeter vector belongs to O. The intuitive
explanation is that the sum of 'probabilities' of events which are
mutually exclusive if the model is coherent, may exceed one for parameter
values outside O.
Given the fact that without imposing coherency ML estimation is
inappropriate, the first problem in empirical work is to formulate
necessary and sufficient conditions for coherency in a particular model.
In a well-defined neoclassical model, imposition of all the regularity
conditions from demand theory is sufficient for coherency. The vast
majority of the specifications of preference structures considered in the-3-
literature only satisfy regularity conditions locally, i.e. in some subset
of quantity or price space. For most flexible systems, the relationship
between the parameter values and this subset is far from obvious. See,
e.g., Barnett and Lee (1985) and Barnett (1983). For other systems, such
as the generalized McFadden cost function proposed by Diewert and Wales
(198~), explicit expressions of demand functions or conditional demand
functions (necessary in case of binding constraints) cannot be obtained.
We will focus on how to impose the regularity conditions in some
'large enough' region of quantity or price space. We discuss this first
for the case of a standard demand system, an inverse demand system, and a
conditional demand system (section 4). The regularity conditions imply
Lhnt, th~ sot of fensible (fixed and random) parameT.ers cannot be too
large. On the other hand, an extra condition is introduced which implies
that the parameter space must be large enough, since the model must be
able to explain certain features of the data. This is particularly
relevant if ineasurement or optimization errors are excluded. In section 5
we show how the conditions can be imposed for some frequently used
specifications of preferences.
In general, regularity conditions for the models in section 4 are
necessary to guarantee the micro-economic foundation of the model.
Coherency however is hardly a problem. The only issue is whether the
domain of the demand functions is large enough. This is different in the
models in section 6, which are characterized by endogenously switching
regimes. Due to non-linearities, the coherency conditions of Gourieroux et
al. (1980) do not apply. We propose to impose regularity conditions quite
similar to those introduced in section 4, which are sufficient for
coherency. We illustrate this procedure with some examples. Concluding
remarks are mentioned in section ~.
2. Concavity and Coherency; two examples
Example 1. A labour supply model with kinked budget constraints
Figure 1 illustrates the simplest possible case of a standard model
of individual labour supply in the presence of kinked budget constraints,
as developed by Hausman in numerous papers (see, e.g., Hausman, 1981,
1985). Given the budget constraint, the individusl chooses the number of
hours which maximizes utility (h~ in the figure).
The individual is thus assumed to solve the problem-4-
Max U(h,c) s.t. h~0, c~wlhtyl, c~wZh.y2, and hCT.
h,c - - - -
(1)
Here h is the number of hours worked per period end c is total consumption
or income. A specification of the direct utility function U(h,c) often
used in this kind of work is (see, e.g., Hausman, 1981, Blomquiat, 1983)
U(h,c) - (bh-S)exp{b(h-Y-bc)~(~ bh)}, (2)
U is increasing in c if b~0. Along each linear segment of the budget
curve, this utility function implies linear labour supply functions:
hi - Hwit bYif ë (1'1.2). (3)
where wi is (minus) the slope of the i- th segment, yi is the lntercept of
the i-th segment with the line h-0, and hi is the desired number of hours
if the wage rate is wi and non-labour income is yi. We assume OCw2Cw1,







Figure 1. Individual labour supply and a kinked budget constraint
It is straightforward to show that the direct utility function given by
(2) is strictly quasi-concave at (h,c) if and only if
p-bh~o. (q)-5-
If the direct utility function is strictly quasi-concave on the whole
budget set, then Lagrange theory can be applied and the optimum h' can
easily be found with (3). There are five possibilities:
A. hl C 0 h' - 0
B. 0 C hl C h0 h' - hl
C. h2C h0 C hl h' - h0
D. hOC h2 C T h' - h2
E. T C h2 h' - T.
(5)
To allow for unobserved preference variation, we assume that b is a
random variable defined on the real line. Hausman (1981) and Blomquist
(1983) assume that b is negative with probability one. For p)0 this
guarantees quasi-concavity of U at all points of the budget set. In this
example we show what can heppen if concavíty is neglected and b i s allowed
to be positive, but nevertheless (5) is applied. Let us assume that the
probability distribution of b is absolute continuous with support R.1)
The following probabilities can be assigned to the five cases in (5):
Pr[A] - Pr[bC(-pwl-Y)~Y1]
PrCB] - PrC(-Pwl-ë)IYICSC(-Rwl-x t h0)IY1]
PrCC] - PrL(-Pwl-Y ; h0)IYlCb((-HwZ-Y ' h0)~YZ]
PrLD] - Pr[(-swz-x 4 ho)~Y2C5C(-~w2-Y t T)~Y2]
PrCE] - PrL(-PwZ-7 ' T)~Y2Cb]
Let the parameter values be p-20 and y-0, and let the budget
constraint be characterized by w1-1, w2-1~2, y1-1, y2-11, T-40, so h0-20
and c0-21. Then we can identify the five cases with segments of the b-axis
as follows.
A B C D
)~C )~C )~C )~C
E
------------ ~----------------- ~------- ~--------- ~----------------
-20 0 10~11 30~11 b
Thus, given the probability distribution of b, the calculation of the
probabilities is straightforward.- 6 -
Now consider a second set of parameter values, p-10 and Y-O, with the
same budget constraint as in the example above. The corresponding segments
of the b-axis are as follows.
B
A IC )~
-~~ ~ D ~ ~ E
~ ~ ( )~(
--- --~---------------~--------~----------------~----------------------
-10 15~11 35~11 lo b
(ana c - ~)
Clearly, in this case the model is not coherent: It is not possible to
solve h~ from (5) (as a function of b). There is no reduced form
corresponding to (5), so (5) is not a well-defined model.
Note that (1) has a unique solution with probability one,
irrespective of whether (4) is satisfied or not. The root of the trouble
is that (4) is not satisfied on the whole budget set; thus (5) may not be
equivalent to (1) and may not have a unique solution.
It is easy to show that coherency of (5) is equivalent to
(h0- Pwi- Y)~Yi~ ( h0- RwZ- Y)~Y2. (6)
This condition appears to be equivalent to quasi-concavity of U at (h0,c0)
for that value of b for which (h0,c0) is the optimum, along both line
segments. This can be shown straightforwardly as follows:
Assume that yi and y2 are both positive and use the relation
y1~hOw1-y2'hOw2-c0. Then (6) can be simplified to
dY2~ (h0- Aw2- Y)h0. (7)
If, being on segment 2, the índividual chooses h0, this implies
b-(h0-Swz-Y)IY2- Inserting this in (7) yields p~bh0, which is the
concavity condition et (h0,c0) (with b such that (h0,c0) is the optimum in
case of the linear budget constraint characterized by w2 and yz). In the
same way it is shown that (6) is equivalent to p)bh0, with b such that
(h0,c0) is the optimal point along segment i.
In conclusion, concavity at the kink point for a specific value of b
is necessary and sufficient to avoid problems of incoherency. It is easy-~-
to verify that concavity is satisfied at the kink point for the first set
of parameter values but not for the second.
The model given by (1) is a simple example of a model with endogenous
regimes due to a set of inequality constraints. The general fremework is
discussed in section 5. One of the goals of this paper is to discuss
methods oF avoiding coherency problems as encountered above. Zn this
specific example there are two apparent ways to do this.
The first option is to restrict the range of possible realizations of
the random variable b and the value of the fixed parameter p. If b is
negative with probability one and p is non-negative, the problems do not
arise, since in this case (4) is satisfied for all non-negative h.
Another possibility, which avoids truncation of the distribution of
b, is to impose (7) for sll 'relevent' values of h~ and c0. Notice that
(7) can be rewritten as
RcU ~ (h0- ó)h0 (7')
Thus, if the fixed parameters p and Y are restricted such that (7') holds
for all relevant (h~,c~) (e.g. all (h~,c~) in the sample), coherency is
guaranteed. In a sense, the latter method is less restrictive than the
first one, since it does not necessarily imply quasi-concavity of the
direct utility function at sll points of the budget set, not even at the
optimum.2)
To conclude this example, a number of observations can be made. First
of all, note that if the usual conditions for utility maximization (convex
budget sets, convex preferences) hold, then endogenous variables are
uniquely determined. This follows from standard Lagrange theory. Thus,
'regularity' implies coherency. Secondly, the reverse does not hold. An
example is given in Figure 2. The unique point of tangency with the budget
line satisfies first order conditions for utility maximization, but
obviously does not represent a utility maximum. The econometric model,
obtained by solving first order conditions, is coherent, but the micro-
economic foundation of this model is lost.
In the third place, almost any specification used in practice will
satisfy regularity conditions for utility maximization only locally. The
main reason for this is the quest for flexible forms. Usuelly, flexibility
is only possible if global concavity properties are sacrificed (cf., e.g.,
Diewert and Wales, 198~). In itself this is reasonable, as generally
economic models only aim to describe behaviour of agents for a certain- 8 -
range of exogenous variablea. See for inatance Figure 3, where the
indifference curvés are convex in a certain part of quantity space, but
not everywhere. As long as attention is restricted to this 'regular area',
no problems arise. Alternatively, and this is the approach in this paper,
preference parameters can be restricted in such a way that indifference
curves are convex in a given area of intereat.
Plql}PZq2SY
Figure 2. Coherency vithout regularity
Figure 3. t.ocal regularity of preferences-9-
Exsmple 2. Non-megativity constraints in the indirect translog demand
system
Lee and Pitt (1986) consider the indírect translog demand system with
binding non-negativity constraints:
n




p - -1 ~ ~ ~ 16 ij1oB vj
i-1 j-1
gij : parameters (i,j-1,...,n)
n : number of goods
vj : pj~y with pj the price of j-th good (j-1,...,n) and y income
si : budget share of good i
a. : random parameters (i-1,...,n), representing random preferences,
i
alt....t an - -1.
The case that the first ~ goods are not consumed and the other goods
are consumed is characterized by the conditions
ni(v) C vi (i-1,...,~),
x.) 0 - (i-,C.l,....n).
i
where
n.(v) : virtual price (or 'shadow price') of good i
i
v: vector of market prices of the goods consumed in positive amounts
x.: demand for good i given that the first ~ goods are not consumed.
i
The 'regime', i.e. the set of commodities for which non-negativity
constraints are binding, is endogenously determined. Each regime is
characterized by some subset of {1,..,n}, indicating which constraints are
binding. For example, {1} refers to the case for which the first commodity
is the only one which is not consumed. Which regime occurs depends on the
values of the ai's (i-1,...,n). Lee and Pitt (1986) show that each regíme
corresponds to some region in (al,...,an)-space. Van Scest and Kooreman







Figure 4. Incoherency in the indirect translog demand ayatem
with binding non-negativity constraints
1 2 0
Let B-~Aij~i,j-1,..,3 --2 4 0 and v-(1,1,1)'.
0 0 1
Figure 4 shows the regions in a-space (a-(al,a2,-1-a1-a2)') corresponding
to each of the 7 possible regimes. For a with al)0 and a2(2a1, no solution
is found, and for other a's (except for some set of probability zero)
there are two corresponding regimes, implying that different regimes occur
simultaneously. This impliea that, given a, the regime ia not uníquely
determined. As a consequence, the vector of endogenous variables
(ql,...,qn)' cannot be solved from the structural model. No reduced form
exists, or, in other words, the model is incoherent.
For other parameter values, i.e. different values of gij, such
problems need not aríse. Van Soest and Kooreman (1987) give sufficient
conditions to avoid the incoherency. It turns out that these same
conditions also guarantee concavity of the cost function in some relevant- 11 -
region of quantity space. Thus, a strong connection is suggested between
concavity of the cost function and coherency of the demand system.
3. Incoherency and ML-estimation
Although the requirement that a model should be coherent may appear
self-evident, one may still ask whether imposition of coherency conditions
is strictly necessary. After all, given that the true data generating
process is coherent, one might hope that parameter estimates automatically
converge to values which satisfy coherency conditions. Also, one may ask
whether it is possible to test coherency conditions imposed on parameters.
This section addresses these issues by means of yet another example.
We consider the following simultaneous Probit-model (see e.g.
Schmidt, 1981).
. Y1 - Plx 4 yly2 ~ E1
w
Y2 - S2x ' l2Y1 } E2
yi - 1 ifyi ) 0andyi-0ifyi(0 ( i-1,2)
(8)
Here x denotes an (observable) exogenous variable, yi and yZ are latent
endogenous variables, yl and y2 are observed endogenous variables and E1
and e2 are random variables following a bivariate normal distribution:
lE 2J 4 N( l~J ' l~ OJ )
The vector of parameters to be estimated is S-(p1,p2,Yl,Y2)EO`-R4.
It is straightforward to derive the probabilities of the four
different outcomes which are possible:
Pr[Y1-0. Y2-~~ - ~(-Alx) ~Í-P2x).
Pr[Y1-0. Y2-1~ - ~(-Plx-Y1) ~(P2x).
Pr[Y1-1. Y2-~~ - ~(~lx) ~(-R2x-72), and
Pr[y1-1, Y2-1) - ~(Plx'X1) ~(~2xtá2).
(9)
where ~ denotes the standard normal cumulative density function.
If the model is not coherent, then the four probabilities in (9) do
not sum to one. In general, their sum equals- 12 -
1 ~ C~(~1x4é1) - ~(~1X)] C~(Í;2xair2) - ~(H2x)] (10)
so that a condition for coherency is that y1y2-0. This rendera the model
recursive (cf. Schmidt, 1981). The condition given here is s apecial case
of the coherency conditions given by Gourieroux et el. (1980).
Let
0-{(p1,~2,Y1,y2);r1Y2-0}. Zf the model is coherent, i.e. BE9,
then (9) implies that the log-likelihood function of a random sample
(yl'xl) " " '(yN'xN) can be written as
L(8) - F loBC~(-Rlxt)~(-P2xt)] t~ loBC~(-Rlxt-Y1)~(I32xt)] t
tEI00 tEI01
. F losC~(P1xt)~(-P2xt-x2)] 4 F logC~(Plxttrl)~(s2xttr2)].
tEI10 tElll
Here t denotes the observation and Iij-{t; ylt-i and y2t-j}. If 8fC0, the
expressions in (9) can still be computed, although their interpretation ia
not clear. Thus, (11) can also be computed for 9EO~`0. This defines a
natural extension of the likelihood function from O to O~.
Let us now assume that the true parameters of the data generating
process are
A1-1, X1--1, p2-0. and Y2-0 (12)
Note that Y2-0 implies that the true model is coherent. Furthermore, we
assume that the exogenous variable x is a dummy variable with value 1 for
half of the observations and value 0 for the other half. Inserting the






For a random sample of 2T observations, T with x-0 and T with x-1, let
K(i,j,k) be the number of observations with y1-1, y2-j, and x-k
(i,j,kE{0,1}). Note that
plim {K(i,j,k)~T} - Pr[y1-i,y2-j~x-k] (i ,j,k E {0,1}).
T-~- 13 -
If the model is not coherent, the likelihood function is not defined.
Thus, strictly speaking, maximum likelihood estimation requires a priori
imposition of coherency conditions. Still, there are mar~y examples,
including the example at hand, in which the likelíhood function has a
natural extension to the set of parameters for which the model is not
coherent. In this example, the extension is given by (11). The researcher
who does not impose coherency a priori will consider (11) as the
likelihood function for all 8E0~ and estimate the parameters by maximizing
(11) over 0~. Our purpose is to show that the resulting estimator for the
parameter p2 is inconsistent.
The extended log-likelihood (I1) can be rewritten as
L(sl.s2.rl.r2) - L1(al.rl) f L2(s2.r2).
where
1 1




L2(R2.r2) -~ K(i.0.k) log ~(-~2k-r2i) `~ K(i.l.k) loB ~(R2k.r2i).
i,k-0 i,k-0
Maximization of L is thus achieved by maximizing L1(with respect to pland
rl) and L2 (with respect to p2and r2) separately. This means that the two
simultaneous Probit-equations are treated as if they were separate Probit-
equations, i.e. maximizing L over 0~ yields a consistent estimator if y2
is exogenous in the first equation and yl is exogenous in the second
equation. Since the true value of r2 is 0, y2 is independent from el and
there is nothing wrong in estimating the parameters of the first equation
in this way, i.e. the estimators for pl and rl are consiatent. The
estimators for ~62 and r2 however are inconsistent, as can be shown by a
straightforward computation of their probability limits: In the limiting
case (T-~), the sample fractions K(i,j,k)~T equal the probabilities given
by (13) and we can write
plim{L2(~2,r2)IT}-o.250 log ~(o) t 0.079 log 4(-p2) t 0.250 log 4(-r2) 4
T-~
0.421 log ~(-~2-r2) t o.421 log ~(o) t o.250 log ~(g2) .
0.079 1og ~(r2) t o.250 log ~(a2tr2).- 14 -
Since L2 has the form of the log-likelihood of a Probit model, it is
globally concave. Its unique maximum can easily be found numerically. In
the limiting case (T-~), it is attained for p2-o.5~z6 and ~r2--0.8405. Thus
we have
plim p2-0.5726~o-p2 and plim Y2--0.84o5~o-yz.
T~ T~
Finally, note that if the restriction ~r1Y2-0 is imposed (which is
necessary and sufficient for coherency), then the resulting eatimator for
~2 is consistent.3)
This example shows that 'Maximum Likelihood' estimation is not
appropriate if coherency is not guaranteed for all values in the paremeter
space on which the likelihood function is to be meximized. Even if the
model is coherent for the true parameter values, the ML-technique may
yield inconsistent estimators and cen lead to the conclusion that the
model is not coherent: For a large enough sample, the null hypothesis
`~1y2-0
would be rejected using standard methods of statistical inference.
Moreover, the example shows that even the estimates of parameters which
have no direct relation to the coherency condition (s2 in the example) can
be inconsistent. It thus makes clear that coherency is a condttío sine qua
non for the use of Maximum Likelihood.
One can argue that the example of the bivariate probit model is not
appropriate, since in this example coherency is well-known to be an issue
and coherency conditions are easy to impose. Thus the fear that the
empirical researcher will fail to impose coherency conditiona might be
unjustified for this specific example. In many, more complicated, models
however, it is much less clear that coherency might be a problem and it is
also less clear how coherency conditions should be imposed. In such cases
the researcher will be tempted to start with the estimation without paying
attention to coherency. The example above demonstrates that such an
approach may lead to an inconsistent estimator and incorrect procedures of
statistical inference.- 15 -
4. Demand Systems with Fixed Regiees
In this section we describe e general framework for the estimation of
a standard demand system, an inverse demand system, and a conditional
demand system. We impose consistency with utility maximizing behaviour and
conditíons whích guarantee that the duel approach is appropriate, i.e.
Shephard's Lemma and Roy's Identity can be applied in order to derive the
standard demand functions, starting from the expenditure function or the
indirect utility function, respectively. We first introduce some notation
and standard regularity conditions. Next we consider restrictions on the
parameter space that can be imposed in estimatlon to ensure that the
estimated system satisfies the regularity conditions. Finally, another
condition, called 'external coherency', is introduced, which states that
the model must be able to explain enough features of the data.
Regularity conditions
We assume that each individual maximizes some direct utility function
subject to a linear budget constraint. Topics such as rationing, non-
negativity constraints, and kinked budget constraints are discussed below.
We start from an indirect utility function vg given by
u - ~8(P.Y) ((p,y) E 'VeCRnxR),
where p-(pl,...,pn)' is a vector of prices of n commodities,
y denotes income (or total expenditures on the n commodities),
u is the utility level, and
8 E O C Rm is a vector of (fixed or random) parameters.
Standard regularity conditions for given 8 E O are (see, e.g., Barten and
BBhm, 1982):
A1. v8 is homogeneous of degree 0:
for all (p,y) E V8 and a E R`, (ap,ay) E V8 and vg(ap,Ay)-vg(p,y).
A2. vB is twice contínuously differentiable wíth respect to prices and
income and for all (p,y) E~e, (~ve~~y)(p,y)~0.
Assumption A2 implies that ve is strictly increasing in y and allows for
the introduction of the expenditure or cost function ee on the set- 16 -
É8- {(p,vS(p,y)); (p,y) E Vg}, ee is implicitly defíned by
~8(P.eB(P.u)) - u ((P.u) E ~).
The dual approach is only consistent with utility maximizing behaviour if
'strict' concavity is guaranteed. More precisely: e8 is said to be regular
at given (p,u) E Rg if the nxn matrix (~2e8~~pclp')(p,u) is negative semi-
definite and of rank n-1. vg is said to be regular at (p,y) E V8 if e8 is
regular at (p,vg(p,y)). With these definitions the third regularity
condition can be formulated:
A3. v8 is regular at all (P.Y) E~8.
In what follows we work with a convex subset V~ of Ve, and we asaume
that A1-A3 are satisfied on Vg. Vg is referred to as the regular set in
(p,y)-space. Marshallian (uncompensated) demand functions are denoted by
9 ' Fg(P.Y) ((P,Y) E V8),
where q-(ql,...,qn)' is s vector of (not necessarily non-negative)
quantities and the components of the vector-valued function Fg, defined on
Ve, are, according to Roy's identity, given by
F8 i(P.Y) - -(~~g~~Pi)(P.Y) I (wB~~Y)(P.Y)
The regular set in q-space, Q8 C Rn, is defíned as
Qa - {F8(P.Y): (P,Y) E V8}.
(i-1,...,n).
The assumptions A1-A3 together with the convexity of Vg imply that Fg is
homogeneous of degree zero and one-to-one from {(p,l)EV8} onto Qg (aee
Gale and Nikaido, 1965).
Parameterization and restrictions in the parameter space
Preference variation across individuals (or households) can be
incorporated in the parameter vector 9. For each individuel t, we write
gt - Bt(W.nt).- 1~ -
Here y is a vector (or matrix) of fixed parameters (with the same value
for all individuals) chosen from some set Y', and the vectors ~t are
independent drawings from some probability distribution which does not
depend on t. The (vector-valued) function gt may depend on t, e.g. through
a vector xt of observed individual characteristics. The most common
example is 9t-gt(y,nt)-yxt}~t, where y is a matrix of appropriate size.
Thus, systematic preference variation is allowed for if gt depends on t,
whereas the presence of the nt's implies random variation of preferences.
In estimating the system of demand equations, the following
conditions may be imposed on the set Y' of possible values of y and~or on
the support 4 of the distribution of the nt's (i.e., loosely speaking, the
set of all possible realizations oF the ~t's). The conditions are imposed
to guarantee regularity of preferences in all relevant points of price
and~or quantity space. Here 'relevant points' include observed points, but
may also include e.g. points for which model simulations are performed.
Which condition is appropriate depends on the type of model to be
estimated. In each case, the conditions are sufficient but in general not
necessary for coherency.
Condition B1 is appropriate in case the model to be estímated is a
standard demand system, i.e. Marshallian demand functions are estimated
and the linear budget constraint is the only binding constraint in the
model.
B1. (Regularity in a minimal subset of (p,y)-space)
For all t, for all y E`Y, and for all n E 4: Vg (y ~) 7 Vmin' t
This condition states that for all parameter values (and thus for all
possible individual preference structures) the model must be able to
explain behaviour for at least some minimal subset,
Vmin' of (p,y)-space.
This subset must contain all observed (p,y)'s in the sample, in order to
guarantee that the demand system is defined and regular at each data-
point.4j If the model is used for simulations with values of (p,y)
outside the range of (p,y)'s in the sample, then
Vmin
must contain theae
extra (p,y) values also. B1 implies that the parameter space O cannot be
too large; otherwise there might be values of y or nt such that at some
points of
Vmin





(p,y)l(p,y)~(p,y)}, for given p,y,p,y.-i8-
Condition B1 is illustrated in Figure 5. Here a chosen set Vmin in
(p,y)-space and (for some given y and t) the regular area's V are
gt(Y.A)
given for two different values nl and ~Z of n. If preferences are
characterized by nl, behaviour cannot be explained if, e.g.,
(p'y)-(p0'y0)~min'
Therefore nl must be excluded from 4. For ~-n2, the
model can explain behaviour for all (p.Y)~min' so n2 may be included in
4. Thus for given y and t condition B1 implies a restriction on 4.
Together these restrictions imply that 4 and ~ cannot be too large.
p0 P
Figure 5. Condition B1 in (p,y)-space
Condition B2 is the counterpart of B1 in quentity space. It can be
used, for example, in case an inverse demand system, i.e. inverse
Marshallian demand functions, is to be estimated. See, e.g., Anderson
(1980), for some theoretical properties, and Barten and Bettendorf (1989)
for an empirical application. In empirical practice, there are not many
situations in which estimation of an inverse demand system is relevant.
Condition B2 however also appears to be important in the case of
endogenously switching regimes due to inequality constraints. See section
6. The condition states that, for given (fixed and rendom) parameter
values, certain quantity vectors must be optimal for some prices and
income. As with B1 this implies that the parameter space cannot be too
large.
B2. (Regularity in a minimal subset of q-space)
For all t, for all y E Y~, and for all n E 4: Q ~ Q .
Bt(V.R) min- 19 -
Condition B2 is illustrated in Figure 6. For given parameter values
gt(y,n), the quantity space consists of three parts: The area where the
direct utility function is not defined (because shadow prices do not
exist) (QN), the area where índifference curves exist but are not convex
(QI), and the regular area Qgt(w ~). The condition states that parameters
have to be restricted such that
Qmin
is contained in Q
8t(W.R)~
Figure 6. Condition B2 in q-space
Conditions B1 and B2 are similar in the sense that they both define
an area in q-space where indifference curves must be convex. However,
since restrictions are imposed a priori, i.e. before parameters are
estimated, it is not possible to tell which point in q-space corresponds
to a particular (p,y)-combination. Thus, if we choose a particular
Vmin
and estimate the parameters imposing B1, it may turn out that indifference
curves are convex in an area quite different from the
Qmin
we had in mind.
Similarly, a choice of Qmin ~d imposition of B2 may actuslly imply
concavity on an area in (p,y)-space quite different from
Vmin'
~is point
is illustrated for the speciel case of the quadratic utility function in
section 5.
Before we introduce a condition similar to B1 and 82 which is useful
if a conditional demand system must be estimated, we first present a
simple example to show why an explicit condition for this case is
necessary. The example shows that it is not sufficient to impose
conditions B1 and~or B2, since it is necessary to take explicit account of
the way in which (p,y)-space and q-space are related.-zo-
M Example with Rationing
Consider the following Gorman Polar Form expenditure function for
three goods, defined for p1~0 snd a1~0 (i-1,2,3).
3
e(u.Pi.P2.P3)--lI2(P2IP3)exP(PiIP3)-P3exP(P2IP3)`1Fiaipit up3 (14)
The 2x2 submatrix of second order derivatives with respect to pi and p2 is
1 lI2 v2 exp(vi) v2exp(vi)
- p3 v2 exp(vi) exp(vi).exp(v2)J
where v1-pilp3, v2-p2Ip3. This matrix is negative definite for vi(v2.
The demand functions for goods 1 and 2 are
qi --lI2 v2 exp(vi) t ai (15a)
q2 - -v2exp(vi) - exp(v2) . a2 (15b)
Note that demand for goods 1 and 2 does not depend on income. Suppose now
that qi is rationed et qi- qi. We know from rationing theory (c.f., e.g.,
Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980), that q2 is then obtained by first solving vi
from (15e), for given v2 and qi-qi, and then inserting the solution (vi,
say) in (15b). Let us assume that q1--l.ai. This is a perfectly feasible
value; it is generated by, for instance, (vi,v2)-(log 2, 1). For this
price vector negativity is satisfied, since viCv2 .
Now assume however that q1--ltai and v2-1I2. Then v1-1og 8)v2. Hence,
there is no shadow price vi for which the expenditure function is concave,
even though qi and v2 are both feasible. It is the combination 91--i.el
and v2-1I2 which causes problems.
This example shows that the relstionship between negativity and
existence of a feasible solution of the rationing problem is not
straightforward. It is not sufficient to know the regions in price space
and in quantity space where concavity holds. In case of rationing, part of
the price vector and part of the quantity vector are given. Conditional
and inverse conditional demand functions are necessary to determine the
quantity vector and the price vector to which the given mixed price and
quantity vector corresponds, and are therefore necessary Lo determine
whether the given mixed vector is feasible. o-zl-
Since the example above shows that regularity in a conditional demand
system cannot be stated in terms of B1 and B2, we introduce another
condition, B3, for this case. First, we need some extra notation.
A conditional demand system is the solution of the problem of utility
maximization, not only subject to the budget constraint, but also subject
to an a priori given set of equality constraints on a number of
quantities. We assume that the quantities of goods 1 through k are
constrained, whereas the other quantities can be chosen freely. The number
k and the order of the goods may vary across individuals, i.e. different
individuals may face different constraints.
The individual thus solves the problem
Mq Ug(9I.9II)
II
y - pI9I}PIIqII' s.t.
Here we have written q-(qI'qII) ' P-(pI'pII)~' ~d the constraints are
given by ql-ql, where qI-(ql" "'qk)~' etc.
Starting from the indirect utility function vg and corresponding
demand system Fg as introduced above, the solution of this maxímization
problem can be found using shadow (or virtusl) prices ( see, e.g., Neary
and Roberts, 1980):
Find pIERk, yER and qIIERn-k such that
((PI.PII).Y) E V8
Fg((PI.pII).Y) - (qI.qII)
Y - Y ' (PI' PI)~9I
(16)
The optimal quantities, taking into account the constraints ql-ql, are
then given by
qII'
We are now ready to formulate condition B3:
B3. Let, for each t, VQt be a given subset of {(p,y,ql)ERnxRxRk}. Then for
all y E`Y, for all nE4, for each t, end for all (p,y,ql)EVQt, there




Y - Y t (PI- pI)'qI
This condition states that, for each parameter vector, (16) must have
a regular solution. It is necessary to guarantee that the domain of the
conditional demand functions is large enough and thus sufficient for
coherency of the conditional demand system: It states that to each y E Y'
and each q E 4, there corresponds at least one vector qII of endogenous
variables, and together with concavity of the expenditure function and
convexity of Vg this implies coherency.
If there are no measurement errors on prices, income or rationed
quantities, then VQt must at least contain the observed (Pt'Yt'qIt)'
Conditions B1, B2, and B3 are similar in the sense that they all
impose restrictions in a subspace of (p,y,q)-space which must hold for all
feasible parameter values. All three conditions imply that the parameter
space cannot be too large. Which conditions are useful not only depends on
the model to be estimated, but also on what the model is used for. For
example, if a conditional demand system is used for simulations in which
quantity constraints are relaxed, then both B3 and B1 must be imposed.
Conditions B1-B3 imply that the space of fixed and random parameters
cannot be too large and thus limit the flexibility of the error structure
of the model. Particularly if optimization and measurement errors are
excluded, the specification of the model must ensure that the model can
explein observed behaviour. In other words, all likelihood contributions
must be non-zero. This implies that the parameter space cannot be too
small. For the case of a standard or inverse demand system, this condition
can be formulated as follows.
B4. ('External coherency')
Let, for all t, VQt be a given subset of {(p,y,q)ERnxRxRn. p'q-y}.
Then for all t, for all yE`Y, and for all (p,y,q)EVQt, there must be an
qEQ such that Fgt(y n)(p,y)-q.
One can think of VQt as the set of prices, incomes and quantities whlch
may arise for observation t. If no measurement or optimization errors are-z3-
involved, VQt must at least contain the observed (p,y,q)-vector for
individual t. In fact, VQt may then consist of just one element. The
condition states that random preferences r~ must guarantee so much
flexibility that for all y~E4' end at least one possible value of ~ a given
(observed) quantity vector is optimal for given prices and income. This
motivetes the term 'external coherency': The model has to be coherent with
available data, in the sense that the likelihood contribution of any given
data point must be strictly positive. Rather than by imposing this
condítion, this may also be achieved by explicit incorporation of
measurement or optimization errors in the model.
Figure ~ gives an example for one data point (i.e. a particular
budget line and a point A on it). For each value of y there must be at
least one value of ~E4 which.produces an indifference curve tangent to the
budget line at A.
Note the conflicting nature of B1 and B2 on the one hand and B4 on
the other hand. B1 and B2 may for instance imply such strong restrictions
on 4 that for a given observed (p,y) (and for given t and y), demand
FBt(W,n) equals the observed q for no ~E4, so that B4 is not satisfied.
This would be a consequence of the fact that B1 and B2 imply that, for
given Y', 4 cannot be too large, whereas B4 implies that it cannot be too
small.
Figure ~. Condition B4 in q-space
For the case of a conditional demand system, an 'external coherency'
condition quite similar to B4 can be formulated:-24-
B5. ('External coherency')
Let VQt be s given subset of {(p,y,q)ERnxRxRn; p'q-y }. Then for all
yEY' and all (p,y,q)EVQt, there must be at least one ~E4 such that






Y - Y ' (PI- pI)'qI
This condition states that certain quantity vectors q can be II
optimal for given prices, income and rationed quantities qI. If the model
contaiiis no optimization or measurement errors, VQt must at least contain
the observed vector
(Pt'Yt'(qlt'qIIt))'
It guarantees, similar to B4, that
each data point has a non-zero likelihood contribution. Note however that
B5 is weaker than B4 since quentities qIt do not have to be rationalized.
The reader must be well aware of the dífference between B5 and B3: B3
states that for each nE4 the rationed utility maximization problem hes
some regular solution. B5 states that the model must be able to explain a
given observation, i.e., to each observed optimum there must correspond
some nE4.
5. Examples
In this section, a number of examples are given to illustrate the
implications of the conditions introduced in the previous section and to
show how the conditions can be imposed in practice.
Example 1: Linear Expenditure System (LES)
The indirect utility function is defined for positive prices:
~BÍP.Y) - (Y - P'é) R Pk-~.
k-1
n
withl~lai-1, ai)0 (i-1,....n). P-(P1.....Pn)'. D~-(ël..--.Xn)'.
The expenditure function is-ZS-
n
eac.X(P,u) - P'D~ ; u R pk .
k-1
A typical element of the matrix of second order derivatives is
{(d2eBI~P~P')(P.u)}i j -
n ak
u { R p } {a,a -b a.}
PiPj k-1 k i j ij 1~
with bij-1 if i-j, bij-0 if i~j.
Given the assumptions on the ai, this matrix is negative semi-
definite if and only if u)0 (cf., e.g., Lemma 1 in Van Scest and Kooreman,
1987). In view of (17), u is positive if end only if y-p'Y)0 so that a
maximal choice for the regular set in ( p,y)-space is given by
Va.X' {(P.Y): P)0 and Y-P'é)0}.
The Marshallian demand functions are
9i- FB i(P.Y) - à"if (ailPi)(Y-P'é) (i-1....,n). (18)
From the definition of Qg it follows that the corresponding regular region
in q-space is given by
Qa.ó -
{q E Rn~ 9)y}.
Rendom preferences can be incorporated as follows:
Yt - ~t,0~ ~t'
where
ët,0- (rt1,0 ""'rtn,0)~ is fixed (and may depend on personal
characteristics of individual t) and
nt- (ntl ""'~tn)~ is random (with a
distribution that does not depend on t).
We first elaborate conditions B1, B2 end 84.
B1. The random variable nt should be restricted such that y-Ytp)0 for all
(p,y) E V . If, for instance, we take V to be the rectangle
min min
Vmin - {(P.Y)~ O~P~P. O~Y~Y}.-26-
then the ~'s have to satisfy
max p'n ( -max max
p'ót,0,
O~pCp t O(pCp
which then defines the largest possible 4 for given y 's.
t,0
(19)
B2. Let Qmin - {q; q)q}, with q some given vector. B2 states that the Y's
have to satisfy y(q , or, equivalently, ~(q-yt 0 for all t.
84. Solving ~r from (18) yields
yi - qi-~a`i,pi (i-1,...,n), for some arbitrary ~)0.
If we define VQt as {(pt'yt'qt)}
(with ptqt-yt), then 4 has to be so
large that for each t it contains at least one value of ~ in the set
{n~n' ni-qti-~~i,pti-Yti,O
(i-1,...,n) for some a)0}.
Note that by choosing a large enough we can alwaya guarentee that n
will be ín 4 according to (19). Hence, conditions B1 end B4 can be
satisfied simultaneously.
It may be illuminating to discuss the role of B1, B2, and B4 for LES
a bit further. Suppose we do not allow for measurement errors. Then B1 and
B2 imply restrictions on the range of the random variables n which depend
on parameters implicit in ~rt'0. This in itself may give rise to non-
standard estimation problems. The imposition of B1 end B2 makes sure that
whatever the estimates will be, the resulting model will be consistent
with neoclassical theory. Moreover, B4 implies that the likelihood is non-
zero for all data points.
In order to be able to analyse B3 and B5 for LES, we first derive the
conditional demand system. Solving
k n
max







qi-7i'oci(Y-PÍ9I-PIIYII),{pi ~ a~} (i-k.l,...,n),
.)-kt1
(20)-27-
where irlI - (Yktl" "'yn) ~'
Alternatively, (20) can be obtained by first solving the
shadow prices (pl,...,pk)' from the first k unconditional demand
equations, with pI replaced by pI and y replaced by y, yielding
n





Y - Y t ~ ( Pj-Pj)'qj,
j-1
and next substituting the solution into the notional demand equations for
goods k.l through n, again with pI replaced by pI and y replaced by y. The
solution is feasible iff qI)YI and q2)YII, or, equivalently, pI)0, pII)0,
and y-PÍÓI-PIIYII)0.
Note that equation (20) has the same functionsl form as the notional
demand functions (18), the only difference being that ai is replaced by
ai~{aktl.,,.. an} and y is replaced by y-pÍql, and that (20) does not
depend on (al,...,ak) nor on (~1 " " '~k)'
Conditions B3 and B5 can be elaborated as follows:
B3. Let VQt-{(Pt'yt'qIt)}. F.~cistence of a feasible solution for given
y-(~I'~II) means qlt)rI ~d y-pltqIt-PIIYII)0. Substitution of
y-~t,0}n yields k.l inequality restrictions on q that restrict 4.
B5. Let VQt -{(Pt.Yt.4t)}, with pt)0 and yt-ptqt.
Solving y from (21) yields
yit-qit-~ai~pit ( i-k~l,..,n) for some arbitrary a)0. (22)
The solution is feasible if
ri~qi
(i-1,...,k).
4 has to be large enough to contain at least one value of ry such that
~t-~t,04~
satisfies (22) and is feasible.
Note that this condition is similar to B4 for LFS. It is weaker
than B4 since the quantities ql,...,qk do not have to be rationalized.
Example 2: Quadratic Direct Utility Function (QDU)
The direct utility function is given by
U(q) ' ë'9-1~2 q'B 9. (23)-28-
where y-(Yl.....rn)~ and B ~11 "'~ln is positive definite.
- "-ln"'~nn
The utility function has a satiation point at q-6-lr, with corresponding
utility level u-2Y'B-ly. The demand functions are given by
q -
g-1~ - (P~B-iP)-1{á~B-iP - y} B-lp
and the indirect utility function is thus given by
`~(P.Y) - 1~2 {y~g-1~ - (P~B-1P)-1Cë~B-iP - Y]2}.
The indirect utility function is increasing in y as long as the satiation
point is not in the budget set, i.e. as long as y(y'B-ip. Homogeneity of
degree zero is satisfied automatically.
The expenditure function is given by
eB.X(P.u) ' é 'B-ip - (P~B-iP)1,2CY~B-lY - 2u]l,Z.
The Hessian of the expenditure function is
{~ZeB~~P~P')(P.u)-{P~B-iP)1,2Có'B-ló-2u]1,2C(P~B-1P)-1(B-1P){B-lp),-B-1].
As was to bP expectPd, e(p,u) i a only defined for u(1~2 r 'B-ly ( i.e. for u
less than or equsl to the satiation level) end p~ 0. It is easy to show
that, since B is positive definite, the matrix
(P~B-1P)-1(B-iP)(B-lp)~-B-1
is negative semi-definite and of rank n-1. Hence, the cost function is
concave for all uC1~2 ~'B-l~r.
In what follows, we assume that there is one commodity, say the n-th,
for which the price is always positive: pn)0. This suggests the following
choice of VB ~:
VB.ë-
{(P.Y): Y~X~B-iP. Pn)0}.
Let us consider the following stochastic specification (see, e.g.,
Ransom, 1987b):-29-
lft - Yt,Oa Rt.
where rt,0-(rt1,0 ""'Ytn,O)~
is fixed, and Rt-(ntl,...,ntn)' is a vector
of random variables with ~,tn-0.
The elaboration of B1, B2 and B4 is as follows.
B1. (~rt o{ n)'B-lp-y~o for ell t. nES, ana (p.y)~min'
If we define Vmin ~ for LES, this condition turns into
min n'B-lp)y - min min yt OB-1P,
OCp~p t O~p(p
which defines 4. It is similar to condition (19) for LFS.
(24)
B2. Inversion of the demand system for given parameter values (including
~r) yields shadow prices and corresponding virtual income as a function
of q: p-~(y-Bq) and y-p'q, where A can be chosen arbitrarily. The
solution (p,y) is a point in VB Y if and only if a)0 and
Yn-(~)n~0'
Thus, imposition of regularity in a given region
Qmin
in q-space
yields Yn-(Bq)n~0 for ell
9EQmin'
~is can be achieved by restricting
the values of fixed parameters only, since we have assumed that yn is
non-random. Truncation of the distribution of n is unnecessary. If,
for instance,
amin
is some rectangle, 2n linear inequality
restrictions on the coefficients in B and
~tn,0
result for each
individual t. The conditions to be imposed in estimation are then
obtained as the intersection of the inequalities for each individual.
B4. Again, let
VQt-((pt'yt'qt))'




Ytn.O- ~ti.0 i~~l{~ij- ptn ~nf}9t~
and 4 should be big enough to contain the ry's obtained in this way for
all t, and for all rt,0 end ~ in the admissible parameter space.
To get some more feeling for these conditions, we look at a simple
numerical example for two commodities. Let n-2, B-1~
~J
, and assume that
~t,0-~0'
fixed and independent of t. l-3a-
81. I.et Vmi~~ be s rectangle in normalized ( p,y)-space, i.e.
Vmin-{(p'y)' 0~~,~~pl~y~vuand v~CpZ~y(vu}. Since it is assumed that p2
exceeds 0, it is convenient to work with the normalization pZil.
Vmin
can then be written as
Vmin- {(pl'y) ~.Cy~pl~~uy ~d vu Cy~v~ }
A feasible Y-(Y1.Y2)' has to satisfy
Ylp1.Y2-y)0 for all-(pl,y)EVmin'
Thus, Y is feasible if and only if
Y2)v~l-Y1. YZ)v~l-Y1V~~VU and YZ)v~l-Yl~u~~~.
Figure 8 presents the feasible area (FA1) in (Y1.Y2)-sPace. In
this example (i.e., for this choice of B) the feasible area is non-
empty for every vu)v~)0.
FA1 (feasible area in Y-space)
` -1 1` -
~ v~ `~~ Y1
Yl~u4Y2~~-1 Ylv~tY2vu-1
Figure 8. The feasible area in Y-space
For each feasible Y it is possible to derive the regular area in
(pl,y)-space: VY-{(pl'y)' Y1P1.Y2-y)0}. The intersection of these VY's
is the region in (pl,y)-space, where the indirect utility function is
regular for all YEFA1: V- n V.
YEFA1 Y
In Figure 9, V and Vmin are sketched. Note that automatically
~Vmin' but the figure shows that V is larger than Vmin' As a matter
of fact, one could have chosen V instead of Vmin to begin with. This




t „ „i„ . ... ,.. .
I
pl
Figure 9. The minimal and the actual regular region in (pl,y)-space
B2. For given y, the regular region in q-space is given by
0-{(ql,q2)ERZ; q2(y2}. Thus, regularity on some region 4min~
{ë('ql,q2)ERZ; qzCq2} is guaranteed if YZ is restricted to values larger
than qZ. and does not impose restrictions on yl. The feasible area in
y-space is thus given by FA2-{(yl,yz); y2)q2}.
Note that B2 cannot replace B1: The region in (p,y)-space where
regularity is guaranteed for all yEFA2, is given by




containing non-zero pl's, it is not possible to
choose a rectangular
Qmin
such that imposition of B2 on
amin
implies
that B1 holds on
Vmin'
Following the same argument, it can be shown
that B1 cannot replace B2.
H4. For fixed y2- yZ ~ end given pl, y, (p2-1), ql and q2 with y-p'q, we
must find a feasible solution for yl from the demand system
91 - Y1-Íl.pi)-1{Y1P1;Y2-Y}P1.
Vmin
V - n V
yEFA1 Y
92 - YZ-(l.pl)-1{ylpl.y2-Y}PZ.- 32 -
This is a system of two linearly dependent equations in Y1 with a






If sample prices pl always exceed -v~~vu, then it is possible to
guarantee the existence of a feasible solution for sll (ql,q2,y) in
the sample by restricting Y2 to be large enough.
To analyse B3 and B5, we first derive the conditional demand
equations. We assume that no rationing applies to the quantity of the n-th
commodity, i.e. the commodity which is treated differently from the other
commodities. Solving
mq U8(qI.qII) - (YÍ.YÍI) IqII) - 1~2 ( qÍ,qÍI)
~B12 B22, (qII, II l
s.t. y - pIqI}pII9II'
yields
9II-B22(YII-B129I)-(pIIB22pII)-1~(YII-B12qI),B22pII-y-pIqI~B22pII' (25)
with obvious partitioning of Y end B. The solutiin is feasible if-i9I'qII)
is in the regular area of q-space, i.e. if
YIIB22pII-y}qI{pI-B12B22pII})0.
Note that (25) has the same functional form as the notional demand
functions, the only difference being thet y is replaced by y-pÍqII, Y by
(YII-B12qI), B by B22, and p by pII.
The elaboration of conditions B3 and B5 is similar to the LES case:
B3. Let
VQt-{(pt'yt'qIt))~





ylelas .:.. ,.:~qcviity restriction on n that
restricts the set 4.
85. Let VQt-{(Pt.Yt.9t)}, with Pnt)0 and yt-Pt9t.
Solving y from (25) yields
where
YII- B12qIt~ B22qIIt- AtpIIt' (26)
~t- {-Ytn,Oa ~B129Iti B22qIIt~n}IPtn~ (27)
The solution is feasible if and only if at)0.
Q has to be large enough to contain at least one value of ~ such that
yt- yt,0} ~
is feasible and satisfies ( 26), with a given by (2~).
Example 3: Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS)
Let v-(log pl.....log Pn)'. a-(o~l,....an)'. P-(1s1,...,Hn)', C a
nxn-matrix with typical element Yi~. The expenditure function is
ea.A.C(P.u) - exP {a(P)~ub(P)}.
where a(p) - a0t ac'v . 1~2 v'Cv, and b(p) - exp(g'v).
The expenditure function is homogeneous in p if a'i-1, Ci-O and p'i-0,
where t is an n-dimensional vector with unit elements.
The uncompensated demands are given by
s -oc.I'vi ~{logy-a(P)},
where s-(sl,...,sn)', si being the i-th budget share.
The concavity condition for the expenditure function is
C is negative semi-definite,
(29)
(30)
where C-Ct~6s'{log y-a(p)}-~.ss', with 0-diag(s). Sufficient conditions for
(30) are
(a) I' is negative semi-definite;
(b) l08 Y C a(P);
(c) OCsi~l (i-1,...,n).
(31)-34-
random preferences are introduced by defining at-at,0.nt, with qti-0,
~t random.
B1. Suppose
Vmin is defined by
Vmin- {(p'y)~ OCv~v, O(yCy},
Condition (31b) requires the following restriction on fixed parameters
and on the range of the random variables:
max (-~'v) (~0- log y . min min- (oct Ov i 1~2 v'iv).
O(vCv - t O(v(v
We also have to impose (31c). Rewrite (29) as follows:
s'(I-a~')n.at O.i'vrp{log Y-~0- at,Or - 1~2 v'r~}. l32)
From this expression it is clear that (c) imposes a number of
additional linear restrictions on the range of n's. Thus, as with LFS
end QDU, we find that the ~'s are confined to a polyhedron, although
in this case the polyhedron is more difficult to characterize.
B2. The characterization of the area in quantity space where the system
is regular appears to be extremely difficult. The reason is that the
regularity conditions are essentially formulated in terms of prices
and income or utility level. Regularity conditions in q-space can be
obtained using the inverse demand system, but in case of AIDS no
explicit expression for the inverse demand system (i.e. the shadow
prices) can be given. In terms of budget shares, such a
characterization is substantially more straightforward. For some
purposes this may suffice. Otherwise, it may be possible to rely on
numerical tools.
B4. Let VQt-{(pt'yt'qt)) with ptqt-yt' pt~0 and yt)0. n can be solved from
the linear system




st-(stl "" stn) ' ~t-(~tl ""~tn)~' sti-ptiqti,yt' rti-log pti
(i-1,..,n). The solution must satisfy condition (30). If OCst(t and fis negative semi-definit,~, tnea a sc"f';..ier,t condition for this can be
derived from (29):
-~i'vt ( ac0- log yt~ xt.Ovtt 2 vtrvt. (34)
Substituting the solution for n obtained from (33) in (34) yields en
intricate condition on
(Pt'yt'qt)' ~e fixed parameters muat be chosen
so that this condition is satisfied for all t.
In order to analyse the conditional demend system, note that
Fg(.y,~)((PI.PII).Y)-9
can be rewritten as
s-[I-P~'~n`at.OtCvi~{log y- oc0- aet Ov - Z v'Cv}, (35)
where v-(~Í.~ÍI)'. ~I-(vl,..,vk)', v1-1og 'pi (i-1 „" k)' s'(sI'sII)~'
sI-(sl "" sk)'' si-Piqi~y (1-1,..,k). It is not possible to derive an
analytical expression for shadow prices pI from (35). Numerical methods
have to be used. As a consequence, the elaboration of conditions B3 and B5
seems extremely difficult.
B3. Because of the intricate way in which pl enters (35), this condítion
cannot be analysed analytically. In specific examples, for given
values of the fixed paremeters, numerical methods might prove useful,
but imposition a priori seems to be impossible.
B5. Let VQt-{(pt,yt,qt)}
as before. The condition states that (35) (with
(p,y,q) replaced by (Pt'Yt'qt)) must yield at least one feasible
solution for (n,pl). Since (35) dces not permit an analytic solution
for pI, this condition can only be checked numerically, but not
imposed in eny obvious way. Note again that it is weaker than B4
because the quantities qI do not have to be rationalized.
0-36-
6. Demand Systems with Endogenously Switching Regises
In this section we consider the problem of an individuel who
maximizes utility subject to a set of linear inequality conatraints.
Common examples are the case of non-negativity constraints (see, e.g.,
Wales and Woodland, 1983, Lee and Pitt, 1986, Ransom, 198~a, Van Soest and
Kooreman. 198~) and the kinked budget set in labour supply models ( Hausman
(1981, 1985), Moffitt, 1986, Blomquist, 1983, MaCurdy et al., 1988). In
contrast to the discussion in the previous section, we now assume that it
is not known in advance which constraints are binding and which are not.
The 'regime', i.e. the way constraints are split up between those which
are binding and those which are not binding, is therefore endogenous.
The utility maximization problem in its primal form can be written as
Max Ug(q) s.t. R q(r. (36)
9 -
Here k is the number of restrictions, including the budget constraint,
R is a kxn-matrix and rERk. To simplify notation we assume that R and r
are fixed, but this is not essential. R and r may for instance depend on
the fixed and random parameters 8. In what follows, we assume that
{qERn;RqCr} is compact and non-empty. Specific choices of R and r yield
the examples referred to above:
Example a: non-negativity constraints: q)0,
budget constraint: p'qCy. -
So k-nt1, R-(p,-I)' and r-(y,0,...,0)'.
Example b: kinked budget constraint: cCwjh.yj (j-1,...,m),
time constraints: h~0 and hCT.
(notation as in section 2, with q-(h,c)')
So k-mt2, R' -(-11...-1m-0 0,. r-(Y1.....Ym,O,T)'. O
If the utility function is strictly quasi-concave and continuously
differentiable on the convex set {qERn; RqCr}, then the solution of the
maximization problem is unique and can be found using the following Kuhn-
Tucker conditions:- 37 -
q is optimal if and o;.~y i.' there ~s ~ome nuY such that
á ) 0,
Rq-( r,
~'(Rq-r) - 0, and
(dU8I~9)(9) ' R'7~.
(37)
If, in addition to the conditions mentioned above, non-satiation is
imposed, then (37) can be rewritten in terms of the corresponding
(homogeneous of degree zero) demand system F8(p,y). This demand system has
the properties
(~UB~~q)(Fg(p,y)) - Hp for some k~0, and
P~FB(P.Y) - Y.
Making use of these properties and substituting ~- fi~y., (37) can be
written as
a ) 0,
Rq C r, and
9 --Fe(R~a.r~a).
(38)
(Since the demand system is homogeneous of degree zero and ~~0 (non-
satiation), some normalisation on a may be added). R'a and r'a can be
interpreted as a vector of shadow prices and corresponding shadow income,
respectively.
To illustrate the general nature of (38), we elaborate it for the two
examples given above.
Example a (continued)
(38) Yields a) 0. P~9 ~ Y. -q i o, ana
9 - Fg({alp-(~z.....~nil)~}.~lY).
If the utility function is increasing in at least one of the quantities,
then the budget constraint is binding, so ~1)0 . We can then choose the
normalisation ~1-1 and this yields, with x-(a2,...,~nt1)':
~i ) 0, P~q - Y. 9) 0. and 9 - F8(P-S. Y)-
Thus we find the well-known result that shadow prices ( p-~) cannot exceed
real prices (p). oExample b (continued)
(38) yields a~0, cCwjh.yj (j-1,...,m), -hCO, hCT, and
- - m - - m m
(h'c)~-F8((-j~lwj~j- ~m.14 ~m.2'j~l~j)~'j~lajYj.Tam,2)
Assuming that utility increases with c, ~lt...tam is positive, and thus ~
can be normalised such that ~lt...tam-1. This yields
a)0. alt...t~m-1, cCwjh.yj (j-1,....m). OChCT, and
m m
(h.c)~-Fg((- F wjaj-~m{l,am.2' 1)'. F ajyj.Tam~2).
j-1 j-1
If all tax-brackets consist of more than a single point, then at most two
restrictions can be binding at the same time and there can only be 2m~1
regimes: m regimes with one binding constraint and m~l regimes with two
binding constraints (m-1 kink points and two corners).
In the case of one binding constraint, say the j-th (jE{1,...,m}), we
have
(h.c)' - F8(Í-wj.l)~.Yj) (aj-1).
In case of e kink point, say between brackets j and jtl (jE{1,...,m-1}),
we have
(h.c)~-FR((-wj~j-wjal~l-aj~.l)~.Yj~j'Yjtl[1-aj})-Fg((-w,l)~,Y).
where O(ajCl. This is a familiar result: The shadow wege 'w lies between wj
and wj41 and shadow income y satisfies yfwh-yj.wjhyjtl.wjtlh, where h is
the number of hours at the kink point. The two corners yield similar
results.
Regularity Conditions
The way in which regularity conditions for the model introduced above
are formulated depends on whether we use (36), (37) or (38). If we use
(36) only, then all we need is coherency of (36):
C1. For each 9, U8(q) must be defined on {qERn; Rq~r} and (4.36) must
yield a unique solution.5)
If we start from (37) and don't rely on duality results, then it is
necessary to impose conditions that guarantee both coherency of (3~) and-39-
equivalence of (37) with (36) (without the latter, the micro-economic
foundation of (37) would be lost). It is then sufficient to impose C2:
C2. For each 8, u8 must be continuously differentiable and strictly quasi-
concave on {qERn; Rq(r}.
According to standard Lagrange theory, C2 is sufficient for the
equivalence of (36) with (3~) and for coherency of (37). However, the
example sketched in Figure 10 makes clear that C2 is not necessary for the
latter two. In this example, ug is not quasi-concave on some subset of
{qERn; Rq(r}, but since this subset contains no solutions of (36) nor of
(3~), the equivalence of the two is not affected.
ql
Figure 10. 'Hax~less irregularity'
In order to be able to start from (38), we need an extra condition to
guarantee the equivalence of (38) with (3~). Substitution of fi~K by a is
possible if non-satiation is satisfied. If F8 is obtained from the
indirect utility function or the expenditure function, an extra condition
is necessary to guarantee that Ug is defined on {qERn; RqCr}. In terms of
section 4, this means that {qERn; RqCr} must be contained in the regular
set in q-space, Qa ~. Thus it is sufficient (but, again, not necessary) to
impose the condition B2, defined in section 4, with Qmin-{qERn; Rq(r}:
C3. For each 9, Q8~ {qERn; Rq(r}.
Note that C3 is stronger than C2, since non-satiation on {qERn; RqCr} is
imposed. The advantage of C3 compared to C2 is that, in principle, C3 canalso be used if no explicit specification of the direct utility function
is available.
In practice, conditiona C1-C3 often appear to be stronger than
necessary. In Figure 10 for example, the fact that utility increases with
both quantities could be used a priori to restrict the 'budget set'
{(41.92): P141'P292~Y. 91)0. 42)0} to {(91.q2): P191tPZ92-Y. 91~0. q2)0}.
This implies an extra restriction and thus a different choice of R end r.
If the model is modified in this way, the example sketched in Figure 10
satisfies both C2 and C3. The restrictions implied by C1 may be relaxed in
a similar way. If a certain subset of {qERn;RqCr} can be excluded a
priori, there is no need to require that U8 is defined on this subaet. See
the examples below.
External Coherency
The condition for 'external coherency' which is the appropriate
substitute for conditions B4 and B5 in the case of endogenously switching
regimes, requires that, in absence of ineasurement or optimization errors,
the error structure of the model must be rich enough to explain observed
optimal behaviour. Starting from (38), the condition is given by C4:
C4. ('External Coherency') Let RQt be a given set of restrictions
(including the budget constraint) and quantities that satisfy these
restrictions. For all t, W and (R,r,q)ERQt, there must be some ~,E4
such that aE K- exists with a)0 and q-F (R'~,r'~). - gt(W,~t)
Similar conditions can be formulated starting from (36) or (3~).
Essentislly, C4 is the same ss B4 and B5. It implies that the support 4 of
the random preference terms ~, must be large enough. Operationalization of
this condition for a given demand system may be difficult. Imposition of
C4 can be avoided by explicit incorporation of ineasurement or optimization
errors, but this is often undesirable from an economics viewpoint.
Examples
The conditions C1-C3 introduced above wíll be illustrated by some
examples. We focus on non-negativity constraints and kinked budget sets,
and use the specifications of preferences already considered in section- 41 -
5. We also briefly discuss the relevance of Van Soest and Kooreman
in the framework of this section.
(1987)
Example 1: LFS
The direct utility function corresponding to (17) can be derived by
inverting (18) and substituting the resulting expression for (p,y) into
(17):
n ai n ai
ug(q) - c ff (qi-~ri) . where c- IT ai .
i-1 i-1
ug is defined on Qa Y-{qERn; q)y}. On this region, ug is also strictly
quasi-concave. Thus, for this example, C1, C2, and C3 are equivalent end
can be written as
For each y, y(q for each q with RqCr.
Bearing in mind that the condition must hold for each individuel t, we
have omitted the subscripts t. For the stochastic specification considered
in section 5, the condition above implies, for given systematic part ~r0 of
~r, truncation of the distribution of n. In case of non-negativity
constraints as well as in case of a kinked budget constraínt, this leads
to imposition of negativity of the ri's 6)
In practice however, the fact that for LFS ue is not defined in each
q with RqCr, is not considered to be a problem. The yis are interpreted as
subsistence levels and Rn`Q(a.y) is interpreted as a region where utility
is extremely low. Thus, maximization of ug on {qERn; Rq(r} should be
interpreted as maximization of u8 on {qERn; Rq(r and q),r}. This can be
incorporated from the start by including the extra restrictions q)Y in R
and r.7) Since {qERn; Rq~r and q~y} C Qa.Y, the only condition which
remains is
For each Y, {qERn; RqCr and q)Y} is non-empty.
In the case of non-negativity constraints, this condition can be rewritten
as
For each y, P'y;(y, where r}-(~1,...,~n)' with yi-max(O,ri).
Note that this condition is much weaker than the condition r(0. In the
case of kinked budget constraints, a similar result can be obtained.8) 0-42-
Example 2: DQU
The direct quadratic utility function is defined in each point of Rn by
(23). C1 holds if (36) has a unique solution. We assume that the set
n {qER ; Rq-r} is compact, so existence of the solution is guaranteed, and
only uniqueness may be a problem. Sufficient, but not necessary, for
uniqueness is strict quasi-concavity of the direct utility function, i.e.
the matrix B of fixed paremeters must be positive definite. For the case
of non-negativity constraints, Ransom (1987a) proves coherency of (37)
directly, by demonstrating that for this specification (37) can be written
as a linear complementarity problem.
The fact that the choice set may contain the satiation point B-Ir, in
which case duality results are no longer valid, is no problem if we use
(37) only. It does become a problem if we start from (38). Thus, for
condition C3 to be satisfied, we need both that B is positive definite and
that B-ly ~ {qERn; Rq-r}.
Sufficient conditions for this can be derived if assumptions similar
to those in section 5 are made. In particular, let us assume that in the
relevant region of q-space, utility increases as a function of qn, i.e.





The maximum of the right hand side of (39) can be found by linear
programming.
In the special case of non-negativity constraints, assuming that all
prices are strictly positive, (39) yields
à' )Y max (S ~P . ) .
n 1(jCn nj J
In case of the kinked budqet constraint (39) yields
yn) max (1821hj} F322cj).
O(j(m
where (hj,cj) (j-1,...,n) are the corners (h~,c~)-(O,yl) end (hm,cm) -
(T,wmTfym) and the kink points (hj,cj)-({Yj}1-Yj}~{wj-wjtl},wjhj~yj)
(j-1, ..m-1).
0Example 3: Indirect Translog
The indirect translog specification was introduced in section 2. In
general, it is not possible to derive analytical expressions for shadow
prices for this specification. As a consequence, an analytical expression
for Q8, the regular region in q-space, cannot be given. We only discuss
the special case of non-negativity constraints, for which there is a way
to avoid these problems. In this case shadow prices corresponding to the
optimal quantity vector are either real prices (if qi~0 then pi-pi), or
can be obtained from a system of linear equations (see e.g. Lee and Pitt,
1986).
The way in which coherency can be imposed in this example was
discussed in Van Soest and Kooreman (1987). By rewriting (38) as a linear
complementarity problem, sufficient conditions for coherency of (38) are
derived which imply restrictions on fixed parameters, without truncation
of the distribution of r~. These conditions are not as strong as C3, since
they do not necessarily imply regularity of the demand system on {qERn;
q)0}. However, as is shown in Proposition 2 in Van Soest and Kooreman
(i987). they do imply regularity at the optimum.
Example 4: AIDS
In the previous sections it has been shown that regularity conditions in
some region
Qmin
in q-space for this demand system are very intricate
because shadow prices cannot be derived in closed form. Thus, in general,
no analytical results can be derived.
For the specisl case of non-negativity constraints, it is possible to
rewrite (38), following the procedure of Van Soest and Kooreman (1987), as
a quadratic complementarity problem. However, contrary to the linear
complementarity problem, we do not know of any results in the literature
on the number of solutions of the quadratic complementarity problem.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied coherency and regularity properties of
various static neoclassical models of consumer demand and labour supply.
Emphasis has been placed on the relation between regularity properties of
underlying preferences, in particular concavity and monotonicity, and
coherency of the econometric model based on these preferences, whích is to
be estimated. In section 2, we have elaborated a specific example of a
labour supply model with a kinked budget constraint to illustrate the-44-
nature of the problems to be analysed. In this example, it appears that
coherency is lost iF and only if a specific indifference curve (for a
specific value of the random parameter) is not convex at the kink point.
In section 3 , we have stressed the necessity of imposing coherency
conditions in practice. Zn an example, it is shown that even though the
true data generating process is coherent, failure to impose appropriate
conditions from the start may lead to inconsistent estimation of the
parameters, at least if maximum likelihood is used. These estimates would
then make us conclude that the model is misspecified. This also
illustrates the fact that it is not possible to test whether the model is
coherent or not. The requirement of coherency is after sll a
not an empirical one.
A usual practice is to estimate
without imposing cohecency
logical and
the parameters by maximum likelihood
or regularity conditions, and then count the
number of observations for which
parameter estimates. If there are
regularity is violated, given the
observations for which regularity does
everyone behaves according
the model. The exemple in
not hold, this leads to the conclusion that not
to the neoclassical assumptions underlying
section 3 shows that this conclusion is inappropriate if violation of
regularity conditions also involves violation of coherency conditions.
Note however that this argument works only in one direction. If, given the
estimated parameter values, regularity conditions and thus coherency
conditions are satisfied, then there is no reason to mistrust the
estimates. In this case, although coherency was not a priori imposed,
maximization of the (extended) likelihood over the extended parameter
space yields the same results as maximization of the (actusl) likelihood
over the set of parameters for which the model is coherent.
If specifications for demand systems would be available which were
tractable, flexible, and globally concave at the same time, then the
treatment of coherency conditions would be straightforward. Given
regularity of preferences, existence and uniqueness of the solution of the
utility maximization problem follows from standard Lagrange theory, at
least if the budget set (with all constraints taken into account) is
compact and convex. In general however, tractable, flexible systems only
have local concavity properties.9) Coherency can then be guaranteed by
imposing regularity conditions in some relevant region of price or
quantity space.
In section 4, a general framework is sketched which shows how
regularity conditions can be imposed which are relevant in case of a-45-
standard, an inverse, or a conditional demand system. In all these cases
it is a priori known which quantity restrictions are binding and which are
not. We focus on systems which are specified by means of an indirect
utility function or an expenditure function, since a number of flexible
systems which are popular in empirical applications fall in this category.
Regularity conditions generally limit the range of possible realisations
of the error terms in the model (reflecting random preferences). Another
condition, called 'external coherency', is introduced, which states that,
on the other hand, the presence of random terms must provide so much
flexibility that the data can be explained, i.e. likelihood contributions
must be positive. The latter condition can be in conflict with the
regularity conditions. The external coherency condition can be avoided by
incorporating measurement or optimization errors, but this will often be
unsatisfactory from an economics viewpoint.
The examples in section 5 show how the restrictions can be imposed in
practice for a number of specifícations of preferences. It appears that
for LES and QDU, the restrictions can be dealt with in a reasonably
tractable way. The reason for this is that explicit expressions are
available for both standard demand functions and inverse demand functions,
i.e., shadow prices. For a specification such as AIDS, the inverse demend
equations cannot be derived analytically. As a consequence, Lhe conditions
appear to become very intricate and imposing regularity is a cumbersome
affair which will only be possible with the use of numerical tools.
In section 6, we consider coherency and regularity of models with
endogenously switching regimes. In this type of models, coherency is much
more often a problem than in the models in section 4. Coherency conditions
are derived for the linear case by Gourieroux et al. (1980), but the
models based on neoclassical theory which we consider will hardly ever be
linear. Instead of imposing coherency, we suggest to look at regularity
conditions which are sufficient for coherency. Various exemples have been
given which show that resulting conditions depend on the exact formulation
of the model.
Imposition of the regularity conditions considered in section 4 in
the relevent area of quantity space will in general be sufficient but may
be very restrictive. It may also be conflicting with the external
coherency requirement. Often it is clear that less restrictive conditions
will suffice, because in practice most of the budget set is irrelevant for
the individual anyway. Thus it is sufficient if the uLility function is
quasi-concave in some part of the budget set, of which it is a priori-46-
clear that it will contain the optimum. (we can for instance often ignore
all interior points of the budget set). By making the area where
regularity conditions are imposed as small as possible, maximum
flexibility of the functional form is retained. At the same time this may
complicate the analysis since it is often cumbersome to specify in which
area regularity should be imposed.
Again, the procedure is illustrated by some examples. Among these is
a brief discussion of the indirect translog with non-negativity
constraints. It is explained how this fits in the framework considered in
section 6. One of the flexible forms not dealt with here is the system
introduced by Hausman end Ruud (1984). Regularity properties of this
system and the way to impose them are discussed in Kapteyn et al. (1989).
The empirical application in that paper illustrates how regularity
conditions can be imposed in practice, along the lines set out in sections
4 and 6.
The approach of imposing regularity conditions a priori to guarantee
coherency suggested in this paper, suffers from a number of drawbacks and
complications. First of all, the conditions given are generally sufficient
but only in very specific cases cen it be shown that they are, in some
sense, also necessary. This is important because imposition of unnecessary
conditions affects the flexibility of the specification of preferences.
Another complication arises because the budget set and the parameters
may differ across individuals. We have seen that certain conditions, like
'external coherency', suggest that the parameter space should not be too
small, whereas other conditions suggest that it should not be too large.
These conditions may easily be conflicting.
An issue that is somewhat related to the previous points, is that the
stochastic specification tends to be difficult. In the examples consídered
the support of the random variables was usually constrained to a
polyhedron. If, for instance, we would specify a normal distribution for
the random preferences, this would lead to complicated truncations.
Another implication of the analysis appears to be that in most models
with endogenous regimes or corner solutions, analytical expressions for
the parameter restrictions implied by the regularity conditions can only
be obtained if a closed form expression of the direct utility function is
available. This is rather clear from the analysis in section 6, but also
under exogenous rationing, conditions like B2 or B3 require knowledge of
shadow prices in a rationing point. Although in principle shadow prices
can be computed numerically whenever given in implicit form, it is hard to-4~-
see how conditions like B2 or B3 should be imposed when no closed form
expressions for shadow prices are available. And, of course, knowing
shadow prices corresponding to given quantities amounts to knowing the
direct utility function. As a result, many of the popular flexible forms
like AIDS or Indirect Translog cannot be used in general. In this paper we
have illustrated how the various conditions can be imposed in a reasonably
tractable way for LES and QDU, systems for which the direct utility
functions are available. In Kapteyn et al. (1989), it is shown that a
similar procedure is possible for the Hausman Ruud specification.
Altogether, the treatment of endogenous regimes or corner solutions
appears to require rather intricate procedures for the imposition of
regularity conditions and it severely limits the number of functíonal
forms that can be considered. Despite these difficulties, it should be
clear that without the imposition of regularity conditions one will often
end up with a nonsensical model. Thus the choice appears between
complexity and incoherency.
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285.Notes
1) The support of an absolute continuous probability distribution with
probability density function f is defined as the closure of
{x;f(x)~0}.
2) Take for example ~-20, ~r-0, w1-1, w2-1~2, y1-1, yZ-11, T-40, so h0-20
and c0-21 ( the first numerical example in this section). Then ( 4.7')is
satisfied. If, e.g., b-1, then, according to (4.5), the optimum is
h`-hz-21, and c`-21.5. At (h`,c`), U is not quasi-concave, since (4.4)
is not satisfied. In this case, the econometric model is coherent, but
its micro-economic foundation is lost.
3) It is easily verified that the function plim{L(~1,~2,~1,~2)~T} attains
two local maxíma on the set {(P1'~2'~1'y2)'~1y2-0}'
plim{L(o.443,0.573.0,-0.841)~T}--2.26, and plim{L(1,0,-i,i)~T}--2.1~.
The global maximum is thus attained for the true parameter values
1~1-1. A2'0. X1--1, y2-0.
4) In some cases, it may be useful to allow that Vmin depends on t. For
example, it may be the case that certain values of (p,y) are only
observed for individuals with specific characteristics xt.
5) As in section 4.5, we assume that 8-gt(w.nt). where y is fixed and n
is random with support 4. 'For each 9' thus should be interpreted as
'for each yEY' and for each nE4'.
6) In labour supply models based on LES, leisure .L is used instead of
working hours h(-T-.~), since LES is only defined for positive prices.
Thus
ug- c (~-ó~)~~(c-~c)ac.
The condition that 'all Yi's should be negative' thus should be
interpreted as ~r~(0 and ~cCO.
~) Note that in that case R and r depend on ~ and thus contain a random
component. Our notation does not explicitly allow for this.- 5a -
8) With the notation of the previous footnote, the condition is:
For each (~~,yc): ~r~(T and ~c( (T-max(O,Y~))w~.y~ for all jE{1,...,m}.
Given that w~ and yf by definition imply that the budget set is non-
empty, this condition is weaker than the one in the previous footnote.
9) For example, the generalized McFadden cost function proposed by
Diewert and Wales (1987) is second order locally flexible and concave
on the positive orthant of price space, but is not tractable, in the
sense that it does not permit explicit expressions for Marshallien
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